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State of the Field: What Can Political Ethnography Tell Us about Anti-Politics 
and Democratic Disaffection? 
John Boswell, Jack Corbett, Kate Dommett, Will Jennings, Matthew Flinders, Rod 
Rhodes, Matthew Wood 
 
Abstract 
This article adopts and reinvents the ethnographic approach to uncover what 
governing elites do, and how they respond to public disaffection. Although there is 
VLJQLILFDQWZRUNRQWKHFLWL]HQV¶DWWLWXGHVWRWKHJRYHUQLQJHOLWHWKHGHPDQGVLGH
there is little work on how elites interpret and respond to public disaffection (the 
supply side). We argue that ethnography is the best available research method for 
collecting data on the supply side. In doing so, we tackle long-standing stereotypes in 
political science about the ethnographic method and what it is good for. We highlight 
how the innovative and varied practices of contemporary ethnography are ideally 
VXLWHGWRVKHGGLQJOLJKWLQWRWKHµEODFNER[¶RIHOLWHSROLWLFV:HGHPRQVWUDWHWKH
potential pay-off with reference to important examples of elite ethnography from the 
margins of political science scholarship. The implications from these rich studies, we 
argue, suggest a reorientation of how we understand the drivers of public disaffection 
and the role that political elites play in exacerbating cynicism and disappointment. We 
conclude by pointing to the benefits to the discipline in embracing elite ethnography 
both to diversify the methodological toolkit in explaining the complex dynamics of 
disaffection,and to better enable engagement in renewed public debate about the 
political establishment. 
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7KHWZLQVKRFNVRI%UH[LWDQG'RQDOG7UXPS¶VHOHFWRUDOYLFWRU\LQKDYH
prompted widespread reflection on rising disaffection towards the political 
establishment (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Of course, cRQFHUQDERXWµGHPRFUDWLF
FULVLV¶LVQRWQHZ&UR]LHUHWDO. There has been considerable scholarship in 
America (Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004; Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Torcal 
and Montero 2006; Norris 2011), and Europe (Stoker 2006; Hay 2007; Flinders 2012; 
Papadopoulos 2013) dedicated to understanding the causes and consequences of these 
trends. This work shows that rising public disaffection, commonly expressed as 
cynicism, resentment and even hatred of democratic institutions and governing elites, 
feeds populist causes (e.g. Mudde 2007; Rooduijn et al. 2014) and erodes the capacity 
to govern (see Olsen 1969; Finifter 1970; Hetherington 2006; Hetherington and 
Thomas 2015). It suggests also that the legitimacy crisis is intensifying (see Clarke et 
al. 2016). Reflecting on the SRSXOLVWDSSHDOWRµGHP\VWLI\¶ politics, Mudde (2004, 
557) suggests: 
More and more citizens think they have a good understanding of what 
politicians do, and think they can do it better. While this does not necessarily 
mean that many people also actually want to do it better, by actively 
participating in various aspects of political life, it does mean that the 
relationship between the elites and the citizens has changed significantly, and 
possibly irrevocably, over the past decades. 
This voter cynicism about µWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ mirrors scholarly presumptions about 
myopic self-interest and calculating strategic action. Rational choice analysis and the 
new institutionalism constitute the theoretical mainstream (Goodin and Klingemann 
1996: 20; Goodin 2009: 9; Rhodes 2017: 212-15). As a result, political scientists often 
model human behaviour in this way, especially the behaviour of the political elite. As 
a discipline, this stance should provide cause for concern. Either the political system 
is as bad as the increasingly disaffected public believes, in which case we should 
FROOHFWLYHO\EHVXSSRUWLQJDWWHPSWVWRµGUDLQWKHVZDPS¶RUWKHZD\ZHGRSROLWLFal 
science needs to change to allow us to tell different stories about the motivations, 
beliefs and practices of political actors.  
Most of the vast literature directed towards understanding the causes of rising public 
disaffection towards democratic government, its institutions and actors, has focused 
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on what Colin Hay (2007) calls WKHµGHPDQGVLGH¶²that is, changes in society which 
influence the demands that citizens place on the political system. This work links 
shifts in public attitudes and behaviour with declining voter turnout, membership of 
political parties and increasingly negative views of the political elite. Surveys and 
quantitative analysis have provided the dominant methods. Examples include the 
analysis of political disengagement and political attitudes using data from the World 
Values Survey, European Values Survey, American National Election Studies, 
European Social Survey, British Social Attitudes Survey and British Election Study 
(for example, Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004; Catterberg and 
Moreno 2006; Torcal and Montero 2006; Clarke et al. 2016). Demand-side analyses 
also IRFXVRQKRZWKHSXEOLFMXGJHWKHLUSROLWLFLDQV¶FRQGXFWDQGSHUIRUPDQFH
ascribing increased negativity to a combination of innate complexity, political self-
interest and unrealistic public expectations.  
While this work has delivered important insights, it does nothing to explore how elites 
are affected by or seek to combat these assumptions. It implicitly treats the µVXSSO\
VLGH¶DVFRQVWDQW<HWthere have been major shifts in the nature and conduct of 
democratic politics linked to professionalization (e.g. Campbell and Cowley 2013; 
2015), the changing profiles of legislatures (e.g. Allen and Cairney 2016), and so on 
(see Stoker and Hay 2016 for discussion). The primary methods of contemporary 
political science are less equipped to explore what drives the beliefs and practices of 
political elites ± WKHµVXSSO\VLGH¶± which has been credited widely with public 
disaffection with politics. 
Greater methodological pluralism and ethnographic methods in particular have much 
WRRIIHUERWKµGHPDQG¶DQGµVXSSO\¶VLGHH[SODQDWLRQVRIGHPRFUDWLFdisaffection. For 
example, the recent publication of rich qualitative work based on ethnographic 
immersion is beginning to tease out subtleties and nuances of the dynamics 
underlying this new ´politics of resentment´ (Cramer 2016) and emotional alienation 
(Hochschild 2016). But, we argue that these approaches are especially important for 
H[SODLQWKHµVXSSO\VLGH¶of political practices such as µSURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQ¶. In 
particular, we make the case for an increased use of ethnographic approaches that 
currently exist on the margins of political science research. Prevailing methods tell us 
little about how elites practice politics, including the everyday rituals and routines that 
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constitute political life. Also, they reinforce the negative public perception of how 
politics works, and curtail the ability of political scientists to tell a compelling 
normative story about the meaning and purpose of democratic politics.  
In this article, we argue for ethnography as an approach to understanding politics and 
government. We make three moves. First, we defend a broad approach to ethnography 
that encompasses more than deep immersion. Second, we build on the small literature 
that makes the case for political scientists doing ethnography (e.g. Fenno 1990; De 
Velo and Schatz 2009; Schatz 2009; Wedeen 2010). In doing so, we debunk common 
myths about the value of an ethnographic approach. Third, we review the small 
number of elite ethnographies from either side of the Atlantic to consider what they 
might tell us about the professionalization of politics (e.g. Fenno 1978; Gaddie 2005; 
Crewe 2005; 2015; Reheer 2006; Rhodes 2011; Corbett 2015). These studies focus on 
campaigning and governing practice. They provide a glimpse of the importance of 
both understanding governing elites and injecting such understandings into public 
debates about revitalising politics.  
 
Bridging the Gap: What Can Ethnographic Research Tell Us about Democratic 
Disaffection? 
Nearly three decades ago, Richard Fenno commented that µnot enough political 
scientists are presently engaged in observation' (1990, 128). Nothing has changed. A 
recent review by Kaposzewski et al. (2015: 234) concluded WKDWµSROLWLFDOVFLHQFHKDV
\HWWRHPEUDFHHWKQRJUDSK\DQGSDUWLFLSDQWREVHUYDWLRQZKROHKHDUWHGO\¶Indeed, 
there is Dµdouble absence: of politics in ethnographic literature and of ethnography in 
WKHVWXG\RISROLWLFV¶Auyero and Joseph 2007: 2, emphasis in the original). At the 
heart of this absence lie key misconceptions about what ethnography is good for. We 
debunk these persistent myths. However, we need to start by defining what we are 
debunking.  
 
What is ethnography?1  
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)RU+DPPHUVOH\DQG$WNLQVRQµHWKQRJUDSK\GRHVQRWKDYHDVWDQGDUG
well-GHILQHGPHDQLQJ¶1RQHWKHOHVVVRPHZRUGVDQGSKUDVHVUHFXU7KH
ethnRJUDSKHUVWXGLHVSHRSOH¶VHYHU\GD\OLYHV6XFKILHOGZRUNLVXQVWUXFWXUHG7KH
aim is to recover the meaning of their actions by deep immersion, whether looking at 
a Congressional district or a government department. Historically, it meant going to 
another country, learning the language and studying the everyday lives of the 
inhabitants of a village, tribe, or whatever unit of social organisation had been 
selected. For the newcomer  it was the only way to become a cultural anthropologist; 
µ\RXFDQ¶WWHDFKILHOGZRUN\RXKDYHWRGRLW¶)RU:RRGLWLVµUHVHDUFK
EDVHGRQSHUVRQDOLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKUHVHDUFKVXEMHFWVLQWKHLURZQVHWWLQJ¶QRWLQWKH
ODERUDWRU\WKHOLEUDU\RURQH¶VRIILFH,WLVGHHSKDQJLQJRXWRULQWHQVLYHLPPHUVLRQLQ
the everyday lives of other people in their local environment normally for a 
substantial period. 
 
2IFRXUVHILHOGZRUNKDVYDULRXVSHQQDPHVVXFKDVWKHµWKLFNGHVFULSWLRQV¶*HHUW]
FKDSWHUDQGµWKHH[WHQGHGFDVHVWXG\¶$URQRIIDQG.XELN-7). 
There are affinities with the case studies common in political science, which are also 
in-depth studies of a single unit or event. The method was criticised often for being 
idiographic and not fostering generalisations. Latterly, political scientists have 
devoted much effort to assimilating the case method to naturalism and its language of 
variables and hypothesis testing. For example, Wood analysed five case studies of 
SHDVDQWVXSSRUWIRULQVXUJHQWJURXSVH[SOLFLWO\µVDFULILFLQJHWKQRJUDSKLFGHSWKRI
analysis for analytical traction through comparison of cases that vary in the extent of 
PRELOLVDWLRQREVHUYHG¶,WZDVKHUZD\RIRYHUFRPLQJµWKHREVWDFOHVWRPDNLQJYDOLG
FDXVDOLQIHUHQFHVEDVHGRQILHOGGDWD¶:RRGDQG6RFDVHVWXGLHVFDQ
be simply descriptions of specific subjects but political scientists are enjoined to use 
them to build theory, to test the validity of specific hypotheses, and to test theories by 
treating them as the equivalent of decisive experiments (see Eckstein 1975: 92-123; 
see also Yin 2014; Gerring 2007). 
 
While ethnography has affinities with case studies and qualitative research common 
to mainstream political science, it is more commonly associated with an interpretive 
approach because it favours depth - complex specificity in context ± not valid causal 
inference (see Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Wolcott 1995). 
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$QWKURSRORJLVWVZRXOGQRWUHIHUWRWKHLUILHOGZRUNVLWHDVDµFDVHVWXG\¶EHFDXVHLWLV
QRWDµFDVH¶RIDQ\WKLQJXQWLOWKey withdraw from the field to analyse and write up 
their field notes. Indeed, interpretive ethnography is less concerned with 
JHQHUDOLVDWLRQVWKDQZLWKUDLVLQJQHZTXHVWLRQVDQGµVKDNLQJWKHEDJ¶7KHDLPLV
edification - that is, finding 'new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of 
speaking about' politics and government (Rorty 1980: 360). Interpretive ethnography 
provides detailed studies of social and political dramas but it is not limited to the 
microscopic. As  Geertz 1993: 23) suggests, µsmall facts to speak to large issues¶ (see 
also Burawoy 1998: 5).  
 
 
This division of labour, while common, is also misleading because the popular 
FRQFHSWLRQRIHWKQRJUDSK\DVH[FOXVLYHO\µGHHSLPPHUVLRQ¶KDVEHHQFKDOOHQJHG. In 
sociology, ethnographers have long practiced µpartial immersion¶ (Delamont 2004: 
206). In the DQWKURSRORJLFDOµculture wars¶ of the 1980s, the contributors to Clifford 
DQG0DUFXVGHQLHGGHHSKDQJLQJRXW¶VFODLPWRHWKQRJUDSKLFDXWKRULW\LQ
representing other cultures. It was said to produce colonial, gendered and racist texts 
with a specious claim to objectivity. Their aim was to deconstruct all essential 
FRQFHSWVVXFKDVµFXOWXUH¶DQGDOOJHQHUDOLVDWLRQV6RZHKDYH 
 
µDWUHQGWRZDUGVWKHVSHFLILFDWLRQRIGLVFRXUVHVLQHWKQRJUDphy: who speaks? 
who writes? when and where? with or to whom under what institutional or 
historical constraints? (Clifford 1984: 13) 
 
The classic immHUVLYHVWXG\ZDVFKDOOHQJHGE\µhit-and-UXQHWKQRJUDSK\¶*HHUW]
2001: chapter 5). WHµVWXG\WKURXJK¶E\FRQGXFWLQJµ\R-yo-UHVHDUFK¶LQµFRQWDFW
]RQHV¶DQGPXOWL-ORFDOVLWHVµ6WXG\LQJWKURXJK¶UHIHUVWRIROORZLQJHYHQWVVXFKDV
PDNLQJDSROLF\WKURXJKWKHµZHEVDQGUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQDFWRUVLQVWLWXWLRQVDQG
GLVFRXUVHVDFURVVWLPHDQGVSDFH¶6KRUHDQG:ULJKW µ<R-<RUHVHDUFK¶
refers to both regular movement in and out of the field and to participant observation 
in many local sites (Wulff 2002; Marcus 1995$µFRQWDFW]RQH¶LVWKHµspace¶, such 
as µa museum, in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into 
FRQWDFWZLWKHDFKRWKHUDQGHVWDEOLVKRQJRLQJUHODWLRQV¶XVXDOO\FKDUDFWHULVHGE\
inequality and conflict (Clifford 1997: 6-7). Marcus (2007a) describes the current 
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SUDFWLFHVRIHWKQRJUDSK\DVµEDURTXH¶ as even partial immersion becomes dispersed 
over several sites. 
 
To be clear, we are not dismissing the value of an immersive approach to 
ethnography. Rather we raise this point to illustrate that there is a menu of 
ethnographic choices, and that some are more suited to studying elites than others. 
Elite ethnography is difficult and poses many challenges. We attempt to enter a closed 
and secretive world, a hidden world, occupied by people who are more powerful than 
the researcher. Observing governing elites at work is the preferred research method 
but we know from bitter experience that requests for such access can be denied. We 
KDYHWRILQGRWKHUZD\VRIµEHLQJWKHUH¶ (see also Nader 1972: 306-7).For example, 
focus groups can give access to a group of elite actors. We can observe them in action 
when observation is not possible at the workplace, especially when the relevant 
LQGLYLGXDOVDUHQRORQJHULQRIILFH7KH\DUHDQRWKHUZD\RIµEHLQJWKHUH¶DQG
sidestepping the problems of access and secrecy (see Rhodes and Tiernan 2014).  
 
TKDWVDLGWKHVHYHUDOZD\VRIµEHLQJWKHUH¶DUHQRWVWDQG-alone methods. Ideally, we 
would supplement each method with shadowing. Most important, the data generated 
by focus groups and other PHWKRGVUHTXLUHDQµHWKQRJUDSKLFVHQVLELOLW\¶IRU
interpreting the conversations (Agar and McDonald 1995; Schatz 2009). The various 
ethnographic methods suggested in Table 1 are still about recovering meaning and 
locating that meaning in its broader context. So, focus groups are an ethnographic 
method because ethnography is now a diverse set of practices linked not by a shared 
method - participant observation - but by a shared focus on the recovery of meaning ± 
the ethnographic sensibility (see also Katz 2009: 5). 
 
Dichotomies mislead. They can become straitjackets. We do not see deep hanging out 
and hit-and-run fieldwork as mutually exclusive. :HLQFOLQHWR)R[¶V
SUDFWLFDODQGSUDJPDWLFDVVHVVPHQWRIGHHSKDQJLQJRXWLWLVDµUDWKHUXQHDV\
FRPELQDWLRQRILQYROYHPHQWDQGGHWDFKPHQW¶EXWLWµLs still the best method we have 
IRUH[SORULQJWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIKXPDQFXOWXUHVVRLWZLOOKDYHWRGR¶,WPD\EHWKH
best method but it is not the only one. We prefer to talk of µEULFRODJH¶ - that is, 
constructing research from diverse methods and materials (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 
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4; and Table 1 below) - and bringing DQµHWKQRJUDSKLFVHQVLELOLW\¶WREHDURQWKHGDWD
however collected. 
 
There is an elephant in our ethnographic room ± how short can a fieldwork trip be and 
still count as ethnography? How long do you need to be there to tell a wink from a 
blink (Geertz 1973: 6-7)?  Marcus (2007b) VHHVOHQJWK\ILHOGZRUNVWD\VDVDµYDULDEOH
componHQW¶LQDQ\UHVHDUFKSURMHFWIn our experience, there is no magic number for 
how long you should spend in the field. There is no magic number of interviews to 
conduct or documents to read (Corbett 2015; see also Small 2009). Most importantly, 
µmore¶ is manifestly not always µbetter¶. Indeed, more data exacerbates the problem 
of seeing the wood for the trees rather than leading to richer and deeper insights. 
µ0RUHLVEHWWHU¶LVDQLPSRVVLEOHVWDQGDUG that can never be met. Our rule of thumb is 
to yo-yo in and out of field sites until you have stopped recording interesting data ± 
when it becomes repetitive and you think you can answer your research questions. It 
is a judgement by the researcher. There are no hard and fast rules. As Marcus (2007a) 
says, incompleteness is the norm.  
 
In sum, our conception of ethnography is broad and eclectic (and for a more detailed 
account see Rhodes 2017: chapters 3-5). The ethnographer is a bricoleur with an 
ethnographic sensibility. We now bring this perspective to bear on conventional 
understandings of the field.  
 
Myth 1: Ethnography is only for the exotic 
If ethnographic approaches are valued in political science, it is for their capacity to 
illuminate features of politics that mainstream approaches cannot penetrate. This 
belief has enabled ethnography to survive for studying exotic regions of the world that 
have unreliable datasets and unfamiliar political practices. As Shore and Nugent 
FRPPHQWµ$QWKURSRORJ\E\GHILQLWLRQLVWKHVWXG\of powerless 
³2WKHUV´¶Nader (1972: 289) was an early voice calling for anthropologists to µstudy 
up,¶ UHFRJQLVLQJWKDWµWKHUHLVFRPSDUDWLYHO\OLWWOHILHOGUHVHDUFKon the middle class 
and very little-ILUVWKDQGZRUNRQWKHXSSHUFODVV¶:KHQWDONLQJDERXWSROLWLFDODQG
governmental elites, little has changed in the intervening years, although we note 
some distinguished exceptions below. Indeed, most of the studies using ethnography 
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in political science µstudy down¶ with street level bureaucrats a favoured topic (see for 
example Maynard-Moody and Musheno. 2003). 
Ethnography undeniably is useful for studying exotic settings and local politics. 
However, this is far from its only use. Over the last two decades or more, 
anthropology - the discipline that lays claim to µowning¶ ethnography - has witnessed 
a shift away from making the exotic familiar, and towards making the familiar exotic. 
Indeed, much modern Anthropology focuses not on the distant village but on local 
settings of everyday life²factory floors, village halls, schools, university corridors 
(for a political science example see Pachirat 2011). The value of the ethnographic 
approach in such settings is that it can cast new light on what we think we already 
know. 
Few settings are subject to as many implicit assumptions as political institutions in 
advanced liberal democracies. The public thinks they know who politicians are, what 
they do, and how they perform (Mudde 2004). Political scientists model and structure 
such institutions based on parsimonious assumptions about their behaviour. Yet, as 
we will show, the small but rich seam of ethnographic research on the actors at the 
heart of political institutions suggests that these presumptions are limiting if not 
misleading.  
Myth 2: Ethnographic data is unreliable  
This myth encompasses three main objections: that ethnography is a risky form of 
data collection; that it is impossible to generalize from ethnographic data; and that it 
does not produce causal explanations. We address each in turn. 
The first objection is that doing ethnography is risky because it depends on 
rich data the researcher cannot guarantee before entering the field. We accept that the 
classic intensive participant-observation study remains the defining method but, as 
above, for the study of political and governmental elites, it may not be feasible. Are 
WKHUHRWKHUZD\VRIµEHLQJWKHUH¶"&DQZHEULQJWKHHWKQRJUDSKLFVHQVLELOLW\WREHDU
on data collected by other means? Existing studies on the margins of political science 
show that there are many methods and sources that ethnographers can draw on to 
provide deep and novel insights into the beliefs and practices of political elites (see 
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7DEOHIRUDVXPPDU\$OOJLYHWKHUHVHDUFKHUDVHQVHRIµEHLQJWKHUH¶'eployed 
together, these methods can be used to triangulate claims, background stories and 
flesh out emergent themes.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The second objection is that it is not possible to deduce laws and predict outcomes 
from fieldwork; that is, it is not possible to generalize (found even in sympathetic 
DFFRXQWVRIµQDUUDWLYHDSSURDFKHV¶H. g. Laitin 2006: 27). The common error is to 
equate generalisation with the formal or statistical generalisation associated with the 
natural science model of research. We cannot formally generalise but we can still 
aVSLUHWRµSODXVLEOHFRQMHFWXUH¶:HFDQ make general statements that are plausible 
because they rest on good reasons and the reasons are good because they are inferred 
from relevant information (paraphrased from Boudon 1993). Plausible conjectures are 
to interpretive research what generalisations are to naturalist research. The aim is 
complex specificity in context, not formal generalisations (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2012: 46-49). 
The third objection is that ethnographic approaches cannot produce a causal account 
of politics; that is, they describe and understand actions and practices, but they do not 
explain them. This myth persists despite rigorous and sophisticated refutation (Katz 
2001; 2002). In fact, ethnography has a distinctive form of explanation, which Bevir 
(2006) refers to as µnarrative¶. A narrative unpacks the disparate and contingent 
beliefs and practices of individuals through which they construct their world and 
identifies the recurrent patterns of actions and related beliefs. We explain actions and 
practices in narratives by identifying the set of reasons, conscious and unconscious, 
that led to the particular action. Interpretive ethnography is about explanation, not 
understanding, and narratives are the way interpretive ethnography explains actions 
and practices.  
Myth 3: Ethnography is uncritical 
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There is a pervasive scepticism about ethnographic methods because they are said to 
blunt the capacity for critical analysis. The suspicion is that researchers dependent on 
elites for access will become uncritical apologists for their failings. This presumption 
is crude and inaccurate for two reasons. 
FirstFRQFHUQDERXWDFDGHPLFµ6WRFNKROP6\QGURPH¶LVWHPSHUHGonce we appreciate 
that ethnography can and does entail the multiplicity of methods of data collection 
discussed above. Ethnographers can piece together their analysis without being 
dependent on individual elites over long periods. They can also use data from across 
these multiple, diverse sources to triangulate the claims that individuals make about 
their actions and their professed motivations. They can compare the data from 
µSUDFWLFHWDONDQGFRQVLGHUHGZULWLQJ¶DQGH[SORUHFRQWUDGLFWLRQV2DNHVKRWW96: 
x).  
Second, the stories that elites tell are not necessarily unreflexive or one-sided. This 
belief is not naive. Obviously many political actors will present themselves and their 
motivations in the best possible light. Yet what we know from existing studies of 
different sorts of political actors is that they are often fiercely critical of each other, 
and of democratic institutions and practices (e.g. Boswell and Corbett 2015). Taking 
their insights seriously can broaden and enrich our understanding of the problems that 
pervade elite institutions. It can ultimately sharpen our diagnosis of the drivers of 
democratic disaffection.  
 
Lessons from Elite Ethnography  
We have argued that ethnographic research can fill an important gap in the existing 
literature on public disaffection with governing elites, in the process debunking 
common myths about what this research entails. Now we illustrate the pay-off such 
research can deliver. To do so, we draw on pioneering ethnographic studies of elite 
political actors and politicians in particular. None explicitly engages with questions 
about public trust and governing elites. Therefore, we reinterpret this research for our 
purposes. In particular, we highlight how everyday dilemmas, derived from the time 
constraints, media and electoral pressures and limited resources of political life, shape 
the FRQWHPSRUDU\µSURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQ¶ of politics. Understanding these factors, often 
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KLGGHQLQTXDQWLWDWLYHDQGµVWDQGDUG¶TXDOLWDWLYHH[SODQDWLRQV, which explain why 
politicians act in a way that reproduces disaffection, enables a nuanced account of the 
professionalization of politicians. It acknowledges that politicians often act in ways 
that perpetuate negative images of politics, but cautions that the explanation for their 
actions lies in the fine-grained, often intractable, realities of political life. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Lesson 1: Local politicians demonise national elites 
As we have seen, the presumption at the heart of rising disaffection is a sense that the 
political class is disconnected from everyday citizens (Mudde 2004). Mainstream 
political science largely supports popular ideas about the increasing homogeneity of 
professionalised party systems (see e.g. Hay 2007).  
Insights from elite ethnography VKRZWKDWWKLVµGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶DULVHVEHFDXVHRIWKH
norms embedded in political campaigning. The pioneering work of Fenno (1978; 
1990) sheds important light on campaigning. Fenno shadowed 18 members in the 
constituency for 2-3 days each over an 8-year period. He noted a tendency for 
politicians WRHQJDJHLQZKDWKHFDOOHGDµ+RPH6W\OH¶. Far from conveying the sense 
that they were a µPDFKLQHSROLWLFLDQ¶IURPa Beltway production line, politicians 
would go out of their way to cultivate and perform a home-grown approach and 
distant themselves from Washington. Trust is central to how politicians cultivate their 
µ+RPH6W\OH¶ (see Fenno 1978, p. 55-57): 
 
Trust is, however, a fragile relationship. It is not an overnight or a one-time 
thing. It is hard to win; and it must be constantly renewed and re-won. µTrust,¶ 
said one member µis a cumulative thLQJDWRWDOLW\WKLQJ«<RXGRDOLWWOHKHUH
and a little there.¶ «7KDWLVZKDW+RXVHPHPEHUVEHOLHYH$QGWKDWLVZK\
they spend so much of their working time at home. Much of what I have 
observed in my travels can be explained as a continuous and continuing effort 
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to win (for members) and to hold (for old members) the trust of supportive 
constituencies (Fenno 1978, p. 56).  
Recent ethnographic studies by *DGGLH¶Vand Reheer (2006) extend these 
insights. Drawing together data drawn many sources using the multiple methods of 
contemporary ethnography - including observation but also interviews and the public 
record - *DGGLH¶VNH\FRQWULEXWLRQLVWRIRFXVRQWKHDPELWLRQXQGHUSLQQLQJWKH
pursuit of a career in politics. His analysis of campaigning reveals how 
professionalised politics has become since Fenno. He identifies twin drivers for this 
phenomenon. First, technological change has allowed candidates to produce cheaper 
and better media. Second, declining civic participation has meant candidates can no 
longer rely on an army of volunteers in the constituency.  
Both sets of insights have implications for explaining the professionalization of 
political campaigning. Political parties engaged in competitive elections have a set of 
norms that specify what it takes to gain the support necessary to be elected. They 
emphasise local identity and political ambition to create trust, and using technologies 
to bridge a falling activist base. These campaigning practices are embedded in the 
culture of political parties, and are part of the trend towards professionalization. This 
insight suggests the drivers of professionalized campaigning lie not just in the 
national party system but also in the micro-level incentives and dilemmas local 
candidates face, which push them towards this professionalized approach.  
In addition, these studies suggest that political candidates themselves may play a 
FHQWUDOUROHLQUHSURGXFLQJQHJDWLYHVWRULHVDERXWWKHµ%HOWZD\(OLWH¶,QWKHLUHIIRUWV
to distance themselves from these negative stereotypes and assert their authentic and 
local credentials, they buy into and reinforce cynical assumptions about the political 
class. Such an insight helps to make new sense of a long-standing conundrum in 
political science survey research²that citizens typically express a deep dislike for 
elected representatives in general while approving of their own representative in 
particular. Politicians are desperate to develop the same relationship that Fenno 
identified more than three decades ago. Indeed, to generate personal trust they 
perpetuate collective disaffection. 
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Lesson 2: Coping mechanisms reinforce distance 
If the public typically disapproves of politicians²their motivations and intentions²
then they equally resent what politicians do. The presumption²echoed in rational-
actor models that predominate in mainstream political science²is that their actions 
serve to gather and maintain their own power, and that they are willing to deceive the 
public in pursuit of these aims. Yet present-day ethnographic research complicates 
this picture. We look at two recent British studies focused on Whitehall (Rhodes 
2011) and Westminster (Crewe 2015). 
5KRGHV¶Vstudy of Ministerial life at Westminster combines hit-and-run observation 
and ethnographic interviewing. His account focuses on WKHµGHSDUWPHQWDOFRXUW¶± the 
many actors and practices that surround the Minster to coordinate the work and 
manage the conflicts and relationships that characterise this work. He describes the 
court as a complex coping mechanism - a cocoon from the pressures of media 
scrutiny, political rivalries and policy surprises and failures. Permanent Secretaries 
and Ministers as living in a small, claustrophobic world. Their combination of a 
genuine need for confidentiality, a siege mentality, and habitual caution can reinforce 
the walls of a closed world impervious both to the diversity of opinion outside the 
cocoon and to the consequences of its actions for other people. 
Emma Crewe¶V (2015) ethnographic study of the House of Commons draws together 
a wealth of observation, interviews and media coverage. Central to her account is a 
depiction of the vast array of demands facing legislators. These demands call for 
different sorts of social performances and can accentuate the perception of politicians 
as excessively partisan. On the one hand, she details the intensive relationship MPs 
KDYHZLWKWKHLUFRQVWLWXHQWV7KLVµJORULILHGVRFLDOZRUN¶LVKLGGHQWRWKHH[WHUQDO
observers until they see the everyday life of a parliamentary office. Crewe observed 
that MPs, even those in safe electorate seats, tended to meet those who were not on 
the electoral register, who faced losing their job, or were dealing with their 
emotionally complex and difficult problems. The notion that MPs can simply act as 
the sLQJXODUµYRLFH¶RIFRQVWLWXHQWVWKHQis confounded by the reality that most of the 
LQWHUDFWLRQVWKH\KDYHZLWKFRQVWLWXHQWVDUHDERXWµIL[LQJ¶WKHLUSUREOHPV. On the 
other hand, &UHZH¶V2015: 153-4) work also focuses on the demands MPs face in 
developing, defending and scrutinizing complex policy. She shows that MPs do not, 
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and cannot, learn extensively about all the areas they are asked to learn. Instead, the 
competing demands mean they KDYHWROHDUQµULIIV¶- 90-second linguistic devices, 
µSHUKDSVVHYHQRUHLJKWDWDQ\RQHWLPH¶, on a topic that they have had to learn about 
quickly. Riffs are a IRUPRIµPHVVDJHGLVFLSOLQH¶7KH\SHUSHWXDWH WKHµVSLQ¶
accusations often included in explanations of democratic disaffection. 
Rhodes and Crewe provide an insight into how the practices that constitute political 
institutions shape actions that are widely recognised to explain democratic 
disaffection. Crewe shows professionalization as a product of taxing constituency 
work, as well as an incredibly demanding and diverse policy brief. Rhodes details the 
µFRFRRQ¶PLQLVWHUVFUHDWHDQGWKHLUDWWHQGDQWSUDFWLFHs, as coping mechanisms against 
an intrusive media. These insights show the everyday institutional effects that lead to 
professionalization, and help us understand why politicians might often act in ways 
that fuel democratic disafection. 
 
Lesson 3: From Incompetence to Impotence 
The final popular charge thrown at political elites is that they lack competency. A 
substantial line of enquiry focuses on the failings of political elites in running 
government. (e.g. Dunleavy 1995; %RYHQVDQGW¶+DUW6FKXFN). Once 
again, ethnographic research enables a more nuanced explanation of how 
µLQFRPSHWHQFH¶FRPHVDERXWLQWKLVFDVHGXHWRXQUHDOLVWLFH[SHFWDWLRQV 
Grant Reeher¶V (2006) biographical account of legislative life represents a rich 
collective portrait. 5HHKHU¶VDFFRXQWGUDZVWRJHWKHUethnographic interviews with 
dozens of state legislators across the US. In relating their intimate experiences, 
5HHKHU¶VDFFRXQWLQWURGXFHVDSHFXOLDUSDUDGR[RIOLIHDWWKHWRS²that those who hold 
power often feel powerless. In his account, legislators reflect that the demands of 
office, and the complex political environment that they have to navigate, can leave 
them feeling helpless. 5HHKHU¶V participants express deep frustration about the barriers 
that thwart their efforts towards meaningful change. 
Corbett VRXJKWWRUHSOLFDWH5HKHHU¶VVWXG\EXt in a different context: the 
Pacific Islands. He draws mainly on over 100 interviews with politicians and more 
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than 50 auto/biographies&RUEHWW¶VDFFRXQWGHWDLOVWKHGHSWKRIFRQFHUQDERXWWKH
corruption and incompetence of contemporary politicians in this region. Unflattering 
comparisons were made with the so-called Golden Generation who had led most 
Pacific states to independence in the 1970s and 1980s. The politicians at the centre of 
&RUEHWW¶VVWRry are complicit in reinforcing this narrative of decline. To win support, 
they make grand promises to improve the quality of governance and enhance living 
standards. Once in office, they experience first hand the inevitable powerlessness of 
running a weak state apparatus in a context of poverty and aid dependency. 
5HHKHUDQG&RUEHWW¶VLQVLJKWVinto the feelings of powerlessness among legislators 
helps to explain why they often DSSHDUµLQFRPSHWHQW¶7KLV time, however, the focus 
is not on campaigning but on the practices of governing. After building up public 
expectations to gain trust during elections, then politicians are thrown into a world of 
stretched resources and impossible timescales. Paradoxically, they confront now the 
opposite goals of managing expectations and downsizing. Again, the beliefs and 
practices that politicians inherit shapes the way they act, and provides nuance to our 
explanation of why they seem incompetent. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have reviewed and reinterpreted several seminal ethnographic 
studies of political elites by drawing out the lessons they provide those scholars 
interested in public disaffection towards politics and political institutions. We draw 
three significant conclusions: 
1) The drivers of professionalization in political campaigns lie not only in the 
national party system but also in local practices for building local identity 
to create trust and foster political ambition. 
2) The coping strategies used by politicians create a Ǯcocoonǯ
hostile interest groups and media, and increase the distance between 
elites and citizens. 
3) The incompetence of politicians stems from the paradox between the 
practices of campaigning and of governing, between building up 
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expectations to win elections and reducing expectations when in 
office. 
Combined, these findings show how attempts by politicians to overcome some of the 
inherent paradoxes of democratic government adopt professionalized practices 
commonly assumed to fuel democratic disaffection.  
For the sake of clarity and brevity, our critical review has focused on studies of 
elected officials. Yet, we can equally point to affinities in ethnographic research 
focused on the broader cast of elites engaged in contemporary governance. Given the 
popular disaffection with the EU, for examplH6KRUH¶Vaccount of the inner 
workings of the European Commission foreshadows Rhodes¶SRUWUD\DO of a cocooned 
civil service. Affinities are also clear in studies of the elite of global governance. 
Echoing &UHZH¶VQXDQFHGDFFRXQWRISROLWLFDOspin:HDYHU¶VHWKQRJUDSKLF
study of the World Bank shows how organised hypocrisy LVFHQWUDOWRWKH%DQN¶V
work. Moreover, lLNH5HHKHU¶VDFFRXQWRIpowerless politicians, OuroussoI¶V 
ethnography of Wall Street elites reveals how these supposedly omnipotent kingpins 
of the global economy remain enthralled to limiting beliefs and entrenched practices. 
In each case, the lesson is the same ± JHWWLQJµLQVLGH¶WKHZRUOGRIHOLWHVSURYLGHVD
more nuanced diagnosis of the pathologies that pervade contemporary systems of 
governance and feed widespread public disaffection. 
So, we repeat our call for political scientists to become ethnographic bricoleurs. We 
do not claim it is the only approach, but rather argue that our ability to explain 
political phenomena is severely limited by ethnography¶s marginal standing in 
political science. Intuitively, we believe most members of the profession would be 
sympathetic to the view that we should collect and use different forms of data to draw 
on the strengths (and overcome the endemic weaknesses) of each approach. 
Ethnography produces descriptions characterised by detailed specificity in context 
that can form the basis of µSODXVLEOHFRQMHFWXUHV¶%RXGRQ and challenge the 
generalisations of other research traditions. It adds texture, depth, nuance and 
authenticity to our accounts of government as well unearthing surprises (and see 
Rhodes 2017: chapter 3 and 4; and Schatz 2009: chapters 1 and 14 for a discussion of 
the pros and cons of ethnography).  
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We conclude, however, by suggesting that elite ethnography might be an especially 
important approach given the renewed public debate about²and insurgent challenge 
to²the political establishment. We have pointed to the affinity between rising 
democratic disaffection and the entrenchment of rational actor models of governing 
elites in political science. This is not to assert a causal link between political science 
orthodoxy and public attitudes. We suggest only that elite ethnography, and the 
human and humanizing stories it can tell about elites, can provide a powerful 
alternative that might at least broaden the boundaries of public debate.  
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Table 1: Bricolage 
Ethnographic 
methods 
Definition Potential data 
sources 
Model 
Hit-and-run 
fieldwork 
Repeated, short 
bursts of intensive 
observation as 
researchers move 
in-and-out of the 
field  
Legislatures, 
constituency 
offices, campaign 
events 
5KRGHV¶V
Everyday Life in 
British Government; 
&UHZH¶VThe 
House of Commons 
Ethnographic 
interviewing 
Repeated, semi-
structured and 
unstructured 
interviews with the 
same participant  
Recently retired 
politicians and 
public officials 
5HHKHU¶VFirst 
Person Political 
Memoirs First-person 
reflections on 
governing  
Auto-biographies 
and authorized 
biographies; radio 
and television 
interviews 
Richards and 
0DWKHUV¶
Political Memoirs 
and New Labour; 
&RUEHWW¶V
Being Political 
Elite focus 
groups 
Group reflections 
that encourage 
elites to flesh out 
and challenge each 
RWKHU¶VFODLPV 
Recently retired 
politicians and 
public officials 
5KRGHVDQG7LHUQDQ¶V
(2014) Lessons of 
Governing 
Para-
ethnography 
An ethnographic 
interview focused 
around explaining a 
particular document 
or artefact (see 
Holmes and Markus 
2005) 
Focused on 
particular 
legislative 
documents, 
departmental files  
Novel in political 
science  
Visual 
ethnography 
Using video 
recordings as a 
form of remote 
observation (see 
Pink 2013) 
C-SPAN (and 
similar footage 
elsewhere); press 
conferences, 
parliament live 
Novel in political 
science 
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Table 2: Lessons about professionalization from ethnographic research 
 Assumption within 
existing literature 
Explanation 
derived from elite 
ethnography 
Implication for 
explaining 
SROLWLFLDQV¶
negative political 
behaviour through 
everyday norms 
Campaigning  Beltway  
 
Governing elites are 
enthralled to party 
machinery for their 
own career 
ambitions. 
 
 
Home Style 
 
Those seeking 
election are at pains 
to distance 
themselves from the 
central political elite 
and adopt a localised 
µKRPHVW\OH¶LQVWHDG 
 
E.g. Fenno 1978, 
Gaddie 2003 
 
Constituency- and 
party-based election 
campaigns set up a 
distinction between 
the local and 
national that 
politicians play with 
to get elected 
Representing  Partisanship 
 
Elected 
representatives are 
too partisan, failing 
to represent the 
substantive concerns 
of their constituents. 
 
 
Coping 
 
Governing elites 
have to wear many 
µPDVNV¶KDYHWKHLU
time and attention 
stretched, often 
insulate themselves 
with expert advisers.  
 
E.g. Crewe 2005, 
Rhodes 2011 
 
Mediatized 
parliamentary 
politics, and a lack 
of practical 
resources 
incentivise 
politicians to devise 
µVKRUW-FXWV¶WKDW
reinforce partisan 
framing 
Governing  Incompetence 
 
Democratic leaders 
are not competent to 
deliver on their 
plans and promises. 
 
 
Impotence 
 
The complex 
realities of governing 
make delivering 
anything difficult. 
 
E.g. Reeher 2006, 
Corbett 2015 
 
The norms of 
competitive 
electoral processes 
require politicians 
to make promises, 
which build 
expectations that 
are subsequently 
dashed by the 
complexities of 
government 
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Note 
1
 This article is written by political scientists for political scientists and published in a 
political science journal, hence the focus on the disciplines of political science and 
(political) anthropology. Of course, we recognise that ethnography is a major 
approach in sociology but for sheer lack of space we leave out the large 
methodological literature on ethnography in sociology apart from the occasional 
reference. Also, we recognise that there are many alternatives to our preferred 
interpretive approach.  
Irrespective of discipline, everyone employing ethnography owes a major debt to the 
&KLFDJR6FKRRODQG:K\WH¶V>@IDPRXVVWXG\RIStreet Corner Society. 
Any reader wishing to explore sociology and ethnography can start with Atkinson et 
al. (2001) and Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) [1983]. However, all is not well with 
ethnography in sociology. 7D\ORUDUJXHVHWKQRJUDSK\LVµHQGDQJHUHG¶EHFDXVH
it takes a long time, is ethically sensitive, difficult to fund, and does not fit well with 
the performance assessment regime in UK universities. The irony is not lost on us that 
we argue for an approach that is out of favour in its heartland.  
The relevant theoretical perspectives can include constructivism, cultural studies, 
ethnomethodology, feminism, governmentality, hermeneutics, Marxism, 
phenomenology, pragmatism, and psychoanalysis. For a brief review, see: Denzin and 
Lincoln (2011) [1994]: Part II; and Bevir and Rhodes (2015): Part II. For any reader 
unpersuaded by our interpretive approach, their search for an alternative could begin 
with Glaser and Strauss (2017) [1967)] on grounded theory, and Goffman (1999) 
[1956] on symbolic interactionism.  
                                                 
